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Our ability to make logical inferences is considered as one of the cornerstones of human intelligence, fuel-
ling investigations of reasoning abilities in non-human animals. Yet, the evidence to date is equivocal,
with apes as the prime candidates to possess these skills. For instance, in a two-choice task, apes can
identify the location of hidden food if it is indicated by a rattling noise caused by the shaking of a
baited container. More importantly, they also use the absence of noise during the shaking of the
empty container to infer that this container is not baited. However, since the inaugural report of apes sol-
ving this task, to the best of our knowledge, no comparable evidence could be found in any other tested
species such as monkeys and dogs. Here, we report the first successful and instantaneous solution of
the shaking task through logical inference by a non-ape species, the African grey parrot. Surprisingly,
the performance of the birds was sensitive to the shaking movement: they were successful with containers
shaken horizontally, but not with vertical shaking resembling parrot head-bobbing. Thus, grey parrots
seem to possess ape-like cross-modal reasoning skills, but their reliance on these abilities is influenced
by low-level interferences.
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Reasoning is among the cornerstones that define human
cognitive abilities. As such, it has gained increasing inter-
est in comparative cognition, but numerous studies
suggest that human-like reasoning skills are limited in
non-human animals [1]. In one of the most commonly
used paradigms, the so-called inferential reasoning by
exclusion task [2], animals have to find a reward hidden
in one of two containers [2–8]. Before they make their
choice, the subjects are informed about the content of
one of the containers; in the inference condition, the ani-
mals see that one container is empty. A variety of species
solves this task and chooses the alternative, non-empty
container [2–8]. However, the assumption that their suc-
cess is based on the logical inference that the reward must
be in the alternative container has been criticized [1,9], as
it appears more parsimonious that the subjects simply
avoided the empty container. In line with this critique,
most non-human species have difficulties when the pres-
ence and absence of the reward is not directly
perceived. This is the case, for instance, when the occur-
rence of noise during the shaking of a container indicatesr for correspondence (cschloegl@dpz.eu).
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17 July 2012 4135the location of the food, and the unbaited container is
noiselessly shaken in the corresponding reasoning con-
dition. Here, the subjects have to make a two-step
deduction. First, the presence and absence of noise has
to be connected to the presence or absence of the
reward, respectively. This information must then be
used to deduce that the absence of noise in one container
is predicting the presence of the reward in the other con-
tainer [4,9]. In this task, only the great apes were
instantaneously successful [4] and managed to use the
absence of noise to infer that the reward is located in
the alternative container. By comparison, in three differ-
ent studies, capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) made the
same inference either only after elaborate training [6],
relied on the occurrence only, but not the lack of noise
[10], or failed entirely [5]. Olive baboons (Papio hama-
dryas anubis) neither used the presence nor the absence
of a noise cue [7], whereas dogs (Canis familiaris) relied
on noise even if the cue was not causally relevant (a
mobile phone ringing in a non-shaken container) [11].
However, the dogs also failed to respond appropriately
to the absence of noise. Three-year-old human children
can solve this task, even though only 4-year-olds may
reach adult-like performance levels and are equally suc-
cessful when relying on the presence and the absence of
the rattling noise [12].
Non-human primates repeatedly performed poorly in
other acoustic problem-solving tasks as well, even if theyThis journal is q 2012 The Royal Society
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thus suggested that primates generally may not be overly
attentive to acoustic cues [14], whereas the same may
not be true for other cognitively advanced species. To
investigate this possibility, we tested six captive African
grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) in the acoustic inferential
reasoning task. Grey parrots are renowned for their soph-
isticated cognitive skills [15–21] and solved reasoning
tasks in other domains [15,22]; because of their phylo-
genetic distance to the primates, they serve as a prime
example for convergent cognitive evolution in mammals
and birds [23].2. EXPERIMENT 1: SHAKING OF THE CONTAINERS
(a) Methods
(i) Subjects
Subjects were six, from 10 to 35 years old African grey
parrots (three males) of not fully known individual history,
housed in a parrot rescue centre in Vienna, Austria.
Previously, the birds had participated in the visual version
of the same experiment (J. Schmidt, K. Kotrschal &
C. Schloegl 2009, unpublished data), in which the con-
tainers were lifted to reveal the content (see also [3,8]
for studies using the same procedure); two subjects had
also participated in a string-pulling task (C. Schloegl &
J. Schmidt 2008/2009, unpublished data). The birds
were housed together with other, non-tested birds in an
indoor–outdoor aviary (each section 3  6 m, height
indoor: 3 m, height outdoor up to 4 m). The testing com-
partment (1.2  0.7 m) was situated within the indoor
aviary, but visually isolated from the other birds. Partici-
pation in the experiments was voluntary, and the subjects
were free to leave the compartment any time.
(ii) Procedure
We used two opaque plastic containers (height: 6 cm,
diameter: 7.5 cm) that were placed on square plastic
cards (8.5  8.5 cm) to allow the lifting of the containers
while being turned upside down. Plastic cards were cov-
ered with cloth to avoid unintended noises caused by
the reward when lifting the containers. The containers
and the bird were situated on a wooden platform (0.6 
0.35 m and 1.3 m above ground). For each trial, the
experimenter baited the containers out of view of the
bird and held and/or shook the containers approximately
15 cm in front of the platform. Then, the containers were
placed on the platform simultaneously, equidistantly to
and on both sides of the bird. The experimenter stepped
back and stood behind the platform at a distance of
approximately 30 cm, looking straight ahead, remaining
motionless until the bird had made its choice. The
location of the baited container (left/right) was semi-
randomized, with the stipulation that the reward was
not positioned on the same side for more than two con-
secutive trials. To make a choice, the bird approached a
container and turned it over with its beak. As a reward,
we used pieces of walnuts, a highly preferred food item
not regularly available outside of testing.
Each session began with two warm-up trials, in which
one piece of food was hidden in full view of the birds in
one of the containers. The birds chose the baited con-
tainer consistently and never chose incorrectly in both
warm-up trials. These warm-up trials were directlyProc. R. Soc. B (2012)followed by up to 12 test trials (i.e. one test session). In
one case, a bird left the testing compartment during the ses-
sion and did not return; the session was terminated and
continued on the next day. Within each session, we pre-
sented three trials of each of the following four conditions:
both: the experimenter lifted and shook both containers
simultaneously for about 3 s;
baited: the experimenter lifted both containers, but shook
the baited one only;
empty: as before, but the empty container was shaken;
and
control: the experimenter lifted both containers, but did
not shake them. After 3 s, she returned the containers
to the platform.
To investigate whether the birds were influenced by the
type of shaking movement, the containers were shaken
vertically for six sessions, and horizontally shaken for
another six sessions; four birds received vertical shaking
first and two birds horizontal shaking first. Vertical shak-
ing consisted of rapid and repeated up-and-down
movements. Horizontal shaking was similar, but contain-
ers were moved parallel to the platform and in a 908 angle
from the birds.
We created a unique and random sequence in which the
conditions were to be presented for each session and each
bird was tested with the same random sequence. As the
order in which conditions were presented for the first
time may be of relevance, we here report the sequence in
the first trials of the first session of experiment 1 (and the
retest after experience training, see later text), until each
of the four conditions had occurred for the first time (i.e.
the first six trials): ‘both’—‘control’—‘both’—‘empty’—
‘empty’—‘baited’.
After the initial task consisting of 12 sessions, we admi-
nistered a training procedure to those birds that did not
significantly prefer the correct cup in the ‘baited’ as well
as in the ‘both’ condition. Training consisted of two ses-
sions of 12 trials each. At the start of a trial, the
experimenter positioned an empty container on the plat-
form and tilted the container towards the bird to show
that it was empty. The experimenter then shook this con-
tainer horizontally without noise occurring. In the next
step, the experimenter took a food reward and showed
it to the bird. She then dropped the reward into the con-
tainer and shook it so that a rattling noise was clearly
audible. Finally, the bird was allowed to retrieve the
food. After the two training sessions, these birds were
retested in the first task, but with horizontal shaking only.
(iii) Analysis
For logistical reasons, video-recording was possible only
from the beginning of experiment 3 (see below), and
choices were scored live by the experimenter (J.S.).
Choices were unequivocal in all cases. Group perform-
ance against the hypothetical chance level of 50 per cent
was tested using one-sample t-tests. As t-tests are robust
against violations of normal distribution, we used this
procedure also with not fully normalized data [24]. To
assess individual performances, we used binomial tests.
To investigate which parameters influenced choice be-
haviour, we constructed generalized linear mixed models
(GLMMs) with ‘choice’ (correct/wrong) as binomial
Table 1. (a) GLMM test statistics of the first experiment. (b) GLMM test statistics of the replication of the first experiment
after the shake/rotate task; in both cases, correct choice was entered as a binomial choice variable; subjects were entered as
random effects. We provide effect sizes for the final model only (see electronic supplementary material for details).
fixed terms d.f. F p F effect size p
(a) full model (AIC: 3823.176) final model (AIC: 3812.9)
shaking movement 1 3.710 0.054 10.918 0.754 0.001
condition 3 11.302 ,0.001 11.293 0.603 ,0.001
order of movements 1 0.111 0.739
session number 1 0.202 0.653
trial number 1 5.241 0.022 5.238 20.049 0.022
movement  condition 3 2.177 0.089 2.176 0.912 0.089
movement  session 1 0.237 0.627
(b) full model (AIC: 1970.185) final model (AIC: 1964.08)
condition 3 9.866 ,0.001 9.848 0.965 ,0.001
session number 1 1.686 0.195
trial number 1 7.930 0.005 7.971 20.089 0.005
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Shaking movement (horizontal and vertical), condition
(both, baited, empty, control), the session number per
shaking treatment (1–6), the running number of each
trial within a session (1–12), the order of presentation
(vertical or horizontal shaking first) and movement 
condition and movement  session interactions were
entered as fixed terms. According to standard stepwise
model reduction procedures, we sequentially deleted
fixed terms in order of decreasing significance, whereby
the least significant term was determined after each
removal step [25,26]. Deletion of fixed terms continued
until only terms with a significance value below 0.1
remained. This was then considered the final model.
Excluded terms were re-entered one by one into the
final model to confirm that they did not explain a signifi-
cant part of the variation. For each factor remaining in the
final model, we calculated pairwise post hoc comparisons
using the sequential Sidak–Holmes procedure; terms
were only regarded as being significant if p , 0.05. To
evaluate the relative importance of terms in the final
model, we compared their effect sizes [26], whereby the
effect size of a factor was considered to be the range of
effect sizes (minimum to maximum) across the factor
levels. To allow comparisons of the accuracies of the full
and the final model, we present each model’s corrected
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC). AICs quantify the
relative fit of each model, whereby lower values indicate
a better fit [27]. All tests were conducted two-tailed
using SPSS 19, with a ¼ 0.05.(b) Results
The birds were significantly more successful in the three
test conditions (both, baited, empty) than in the control
condition (GLMM, see table 1a for the full and the final
model, Sidak: all p  0.001), whereas no difference could
be found between the test conditions (Sidak: all
p  0.719). Thus, similar to the great apes and in contrast
to all other species tested so far [4–7,10,28], the grey par-
rots spontaneously used the presence and the absence of a
rattling noise to deduce the location of hidden food.
Interestingly however, their performance was strongly
influenced by the direction of the shaking movement: In
the ‘baited’ and in the ‘empty’ condition, the birds wereProc. R. Soc. B (2012)significantly more successful when the containers were
shaken horizontally than when they were shaken vertically
(Sidak: p ¼ 0.011 and p ¼ 0.009, respectively). Their per-
formance in the ‘both’ condition was also better when the
containers were shaken horizontally than when shaken ver-
tically, but the comparison failed to reach significance
(Sidak: p ¼ 0.076). In the control condition, in which the
containers were not shaken and thus perceptually identical
for both treatments (horizontal versus vertical), we did not
find a significant difference between horizontal and vertical
control treatment (Sidak: p ¼ 0.681; figure 1a). Accord-
ingly, the birds correctly identified the baited container in
all three test conditions when the containers were shaken
horizontally (one-sample t-tests, all p  0.005), but not
in the corresponding control condition or in any of the
four conditions when the containers were shaken vertically
(all p  0.104; figure 1a). More subjects significantly pre-
ferred the baited container in the ‘baited’, ‘both’ and
‘empty’ condition when the containers were shaken hori-
zontally (five, four and four individuals, respectively),
than when the containers were shaken vertically (one
parrot in the ‘both’ and in the ‘empty’ condition; all bino-
mial tests: p  0.031). The birds’ performance was
independent from the sequence in which they were con-
fronted with the two shaking movements (table 1a).
The subjects’ performance remained relatively constant
over the course of the experiment. A very moderate decline
in later trials within sessions (effect size:20.049; table 1a)
was detectable, but we did not find any evidence for a
change of performance across sessions (table 1a). This
argues against a rapid learning process during the course
of the experiment. The near-perfect first-trial performance
in the ‘both’ and in the ‘empty’ condition with both
shaking movements (figure 1b) adds additional support
to this interpretation. It is noteworthy that the birds appar-
ently managed to continue on this high success level with
the horizontal shaking movement only; nevertheless, this
finding needs to be treated with caution because of the
small number of subjects. Interestingly, the subjects per-
formed relatively poorly in the first trial of the ‘baited’
condition (figure 1b).
Despite their large overall success, we found consider-
able inter-individual performance differences. All subjects
performed significantly above chance level in at least one
test condition (binomial test), but only three of the six
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Figure 1. (a) Performance of six African grey parrots in the
three test conditions and the control condition of the first
experiment (vertical (filled grey bars) versus horizontal
(open bars) treatment). The horizontal line indicates the
50% chance level. Asterisks above the bars indicate signifi-
cant deviation from chance level (one-sample t-test).
Boxplots show median and 25th and 75th percentiles, whis-
kers show 10th and 90th percentiles and dots represent
outliers. (b) Number of successful subjects in the first exper-
iment on the first trial of each condition in each treatment.
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‘both’ and in the ‘baited’ condition (see electronic sup-
plementary material, table S1 for individual performance
data). This may be attributed to the simultaneous shaking
of both containers in the ‘both’ condition, which may
have increased attentional demands. Therefore, those
three birds that had not been individually significant in
the ‘both’ and ‘baited’ condition received two training ses-
sions. When afterwards being retested in the shaking task
(using horizontal shaking only), these three birds selected
the baited container significantly above chance in the
‘both’ and in the ‘baited’ condition (binomial-test, all p 
0.031), but failed to reach significance in the ‘empty’ con-
dition, with success rates of 55.6 per cent, 66.7 per cent and
72.2 per cent of the trials, respectively (see also electronic
supplementary material, table S2).3. EXPERIMENT 2: ROTATE VERSUS SHAKE
The first experiment demonstrated that grey parrots can
use the presence and the absence of noise to identify
the baited container; however, it is not clear whether
they indeed came to understand the causal link between
shaking, occurrence of noise and the presence and
absence of food. For instance, it was suggested that the
success in the ‘empty’ condition may have resulted fromProc. R. Soc. B (2012)the avoidance of a container being shaken noiselessly
[4,28]. We investigated this possibility in the next exper-
iment. The subjects had a choice between a noiseless
container shaken horizontally and a noiseless container
being rotated three times around its horizontal axis. The
logic here is that if the birds had solved the ‘empty’ con-
dition by avoiding the combination of horizontal shaking
and lack of noise, they should continue to do so in the
current experiment. However, they should choose at
random if they can assess that the silence during horizon-
tal shaking is not indicative for a reward because of the
noiseless movement of both containers.
(a) Methods
The subjects and the general procedure were identical to
the first experiment, with the exception that we did not
apply warm-up trials. We conducted four sessions with
horizontal shaking, consisting of 12 trials each. We pre-
sented three conditions per session, with four trials per
condition in randomized order:
both: both containers were shaken simultaneously
(identical to experiment 1);
control: both containers were lifted but not shaken
(identical to experiment 1); and
rotate versus shake: both containers were lifted and
shaken simultaneously. One container was shaken hori-
zontally (as before), the other container was rotated
three times around its horizontal axis. In this condition,
both containers were un-baited.
(b) Results
As in the previous experiment, the birds preferred the
baited container in the ‘both’ (p , 0.001), but not in
the ‘control’ condition (p ¼ 0.793). However, we found
no preference for any movement in the ‘rotate versus
shake’ condition (see also electronic supplementary
material, table S3), neither over the course of the entire
experiment (one-sample t-test: p ¼ 0.576), nor in the
very first trial (two of six birds chose the rotated con-
tainer). The rotated container was also not chosen more
often in the first half of the trials than in the second half
of the trials (paired t-test: p ¼ 0.576). Thus, this exper-
iment illustrates that the ‘empty’ condition in the first
experiment was not solved through an intrinsic avoidance
of a horizontally shaken noiseless container.4. EXPERIMENT 3: RETEST OF EXPERIMENT 1 WITH
HORIZONTAL SHAKING ONLY
We next replicated our original shaking experiment, but
restricted it to the horizontal shaking movement. This
was carried out to test whether the exposure to a con-
dition in which no food could be obtained, i.e. the
‘rotate versus shake’ condition, had an effect on the
birds’ performance.
(a) Methods
Subjects, procedure and analysis were identical to exper-
iment 1 with the exception that horizontal shaking was
used only. One session was interrupted, because the
bird left the testing compartment and did not return; it
was continued on the next day. A second coder analysed
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Figure 2. Performance of the birds in experiment 3, the replica-
tion of the shaking task (conducted after the ‘shake-rotate’—
control). Asterisks above the bars indicate a significant devi-
ation from chance level (one-sample t-test). Different letters
above the x-axis indicate significant differences between the
conditions (post hoc Sidak test). Boxplots show median, and
25th and 75th percentiles, whiskers show 10th and 90th
percentiles and dots represent outliers.
Inferential reasoning in grey parrots C. Schloegl et al. 413920 per cent of the trials and the interobserver reliability
was excellent (Cohen’s k ¼ 0.93).
(b) Results
The birds again preferred the baited cup significantly more
often in the ‘both’ and in the ‘baited’ condition than in the
‘control’ condition (Sidak: p  0.003; see table 1b for full
and final model).However, we could no longer find a differ-
ence between the ‘empty’ and the ‘control’ condition
(Sidak: p ¼ 0.38), and the birds’ choices differed from
chance only in the ‘both’ (one-sample t-test: p, 0.001)
and the ‘baited’ condition (p, 0.001), but not in the
‘empty’ (p ¼ 0.248) and the ‘control’ condition (p ¼
0.611). Still, five of the six birds chose the correct container
in the ‘empty’ condition preferentially, even though the
strength of their preferences decreased from the first exper-
iment (see electronic supplementary material, table S4 for
individual performance data). The lack of significance on
the group level is largely attributable to a single subject
that switched its preference and now selected the incorrect
container in the majority of trials (figure 2).5. EXPERIMENT 4: PLAYBACK
The previous experiment confirmed that grey parrots rely
on the occurrence of rattling noise to identify the baited
container. However, it is still possible that they may
have learned to associate noise with a reward, but did
not understand the causal link between the two. Thus,
in our last experiment we conducted playback trials,
in which the containers were not shaken, but the noise
was broadcasted from small speakers attached to the
experimenter’s wrist and hidden under her sleeves.
(a) Methods
The same birds served as subjects, and the general pro-
cedure was identical to experiment 1. In a total of six
sessions, three birds left the testing compartment before
the end of a session (each bird did so twice); these
sessions were continued on the following day.Proc. R. Soc. B (2012)The birds received 16 sessions with horizontal shaking,
andwe presented twowarm-up and 12 test trials per session.
The test trialsweredistributed across sixdifferent conditions:
baited: both containers were lifted and the baited one was
shaken (identical to experiment 1); and
empty: both containers were lifted and the empty one was
shaken (identical to experiment 1).
These two conditions were presented four times per session.
Asunrewardedprobe trialswepresentedonceper session:
shaking, noise playback: both containers were lifted, one
container was shaken and noise was played back on
the side of the shaken container;
no shaking, noise playback: as before, but the exper-
imenter lifted the containers without shaking them;
playback of noise randomly from the left or the right
speaker;
shaking, silent playback: as ‘shaking, noise playback’, but
a recording containing silence only was played back
from the side of the shaken container; and
no shaking, silent playback: as ‘no shaking, noise
playback’, but with a recording of silence.
During all trials, the experimenter wore two loudspea-
kers (X-mini capsule speakers; 5  5  4.5 cm) attached
to her wrist, hidden in the sleeves of her shirt (see elec-
tronic supplementary material, figure S1). The
loudspeakers were connected to a MP3 player (Samsung
Digital Audio YP-U2R). In contrast to other playback
controls [4,6], this allowed us to broadcast the sound of
rattling food from close to each of the two containers
without changing the visual appearance of the set-up.
For the playback, we used six different recordings of
noise produced by the shaking movement of walnut
pieces. Recordings were obtained with a Marantz PMD
660 solid-state recorder using a Sennheiser K6ME67
microphone, and were saved as *.wav files (sampling
rate ¼ 48 kHz, amplitude resolution ¼ 16 bit). We further
produced six synthetical files containing no noise to con-
trol for hints the experimenter might have given during
the playback procedure, e.g. the switch-on click. Mono
playback files and silent noise files were produced with
Adobe Soundbooth CS4 for Macintosh and were played
back at naturally occurring sound pressure levels of
64 dB (at 1 m distance). We randomly picked one file
from the pool of recordings for each trial. A second obser-
ver coded 5 per cent of the trials and the interobserver
reliability was excellent (Cohen’s k ¼ 1).(b) Results
When a rattling noise was audible and the container was
shaken, the birds significantly preferred the shaken con-
tainer. Importantly, this was the case regardless of
whether the noise was produced by the food (‘baited’
condition) or by the playback (‘shaking, noise playback’;
one-sample t-test: in both cases, p  0.002). On an indi-
vidual level, five birds significantly preferred the correct
container in the ‘baited’ condition, and three did so if
the container was shaken and the noise was played back
(‘shaking, noise playback’; binomial-tests, all p  0.033;
see electronic supplementary material, table S5 for indi-
vidual performance data). The birds, however, did not
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Figure 3. Performance of six grey parrots in the playback experiment (experiment 4). Asterisks above the bars indicate a sig-
nificant deviation from chance level (one-sample t-test). Boxplots show median and 25th and 75th percentiles, whiskers show
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stemmed from the playback but the container was not
shaken (one-sample t-test, p ¼ 0.576). In the ‘empty’
condition and in both conditions in which a silent play-
back was broadcasted, the birds did not have a
significant preference for a container (all p  0.378;
figure 3). Only one bird preferred the non-shaken con-
tainer, if the other container was shaken and a silent
playback was broadcasted (‘shaking, silent playback’),
whereas none of the birds had a preference in any of the
other conditions. The reliance on the noise in the
‘baited’ and in the ‘shaking, noise playback’ condition
suggests that the birds treated the noise as being caused
by the food, even if it was played back. In consequence,
the lack of preference for the noisy container in the ‘no
shaking, noise playback’ condition thus cannot be
explained as an artefact caused by using recorded noise.
Instead, it is more plausible that the birds did not prefer
the noisy container, because the causal chain was broken
and the noise occurred without shaking movement.6. GENERAL DISCUSSION
Through a series of experiments we found compelling
evidence for the ability of African grey parrots to use
noise created during the shaking of containers to detect
hidden food. Even from the very first trial, our subjects
could also use the absence of noise in a shaken container
to infer that food must be in the other, non-shaken con-
tainer. Such behaviour has so far been shown only in
the great apes [4,28] but not in any other non-human
animal [5–7,11]. Human children solve this task from
an age of 3–4 years, and the birds’ success rate was com-
parable to those of the 3-year-olds [12]. The parrots’
near-perfect first-trial performances as well as the results
of our control experiments suggest that an understanding
of the causal properties underlying the task is the most
likely explanation for the birds’ performance. Neverthe-
less, we cannot entirely exclude an explanation based on
associative learning of a complex rule [1]. The birds
may have learned within their very first trial that a
compound contingency of shaking and noise jointlyProc. R. Soc. B (2012)indicates the presence of the reward. Still, causal under-
standing and learning are most likely tightly connected
and should not be treated as two opposing or discrete
mechanisms. Instead, it appears more realistic to consider
causal understanding and learning processes as working in
concert. Thereby, a ‘folk-physical’ understanding of the
world’s contingencies is adjusted through experience [29].
One of the most striking results is the large effect of the
direction of the shaking movement. One potential expla-
nation is an interference with pre-defined grey parrot
behavioural cues. We noted that during vertical shaking
trials, some birds turned around or began with head bob-
bing, a typical parrot action pattern featuring a repeated
up-and-down movement of the head that is displayed
in various contexts. Even though speculative, the per-
ceptual similarity of head bobbing and vertical shaking
might have distracted the birds and elicited alternative
responses. This resembles observations that certain be-
havioural responses cannot be elicited through classical
conditioning, if the anticipated response interferes with
a component of the species’ behavioural repertoire [30].
It is remarkable that these largely experimentally naive
parrots solved a task that experimentally highly experi-
enced monkeys were not able to solve [5,6]. However,
this does not necessarily imply that parrots outperform
primates cognitively, as these tasks may fit better to the
sensory orientation of parrots [31]. It was suggested
that primates may not be good at solving discriminatory
tasks in the acoustic domain [13] owing to the relative
unimportance of acoustic information in their feeding
ecology [14]. Capuchin monkeys, however, do tap on
stones and use acoustic feedback to assess the stones’ suit-
ability as pounding tools [32]. Hence, noise cues clearly
play a role for capuchins, but the absence of noise may
be irrelevant to them. For the moment it remains unclear
why grey parrots make use of this information, but the
birds’ behaviour is consistent with that of other studies
highlighting the inferential abilities of this species. For
instance, Alex, Irene Pepperberg’s language-trained grey
parrot, made inferential choices in a vocal labelling task
[22], and another grey parrot has recently been shown to
deduce the actions of a human experimenter in a food
Inferential reasoning in grey parrots C. Schloegl et al. 4141hiding and pilfering task [15]. A critic may argue that the
birds may have picked up on subtle experimenter-given
cues. This, however, appears extremely unlikely, because
the parrots solved the task only when the cups were
shaken horizontally and stopped choosing correctly in the
‘empty’ condition of experiment 3 which we did not antici-
pate. In consequence, if they had been guided by
experimenter-given cues, the birds should have chosen
the baited container also in these trials.
Interestingly, on their very first trials of experiment 1,
our parrots chose correctly in the ‘empty’ and the ‘both’,
but not in the ‘baited’ condition. This finding came as a
surprise, but might be explained by the sequence of trial
presentations. The first ‘baited’ trial was conducted in
direct succession of two consecutive ‘empty’ trials,
which initially may have confused the birds; however,
they apparently overcame this confusion rapidly and
reliably chose the correct container in all test conditions.
From there on, they were consistent in their reliance on
the presence of the noise, whereas they stopped respond-
ing to the absence of the noise after the shake–rotate task
(experiment 2). This may be explained by a partial extinc-
tion because of a repeated use of unrewarded probe trials,
and on the first glance seems to contradict the idea of
causal understanding. However, silence is a more ambig-
uous cue than the presence of noise. Under physically
salient conditions, the occurrence of noise during a shak-
ing movement is causally predictive for the presence of
something, whereas the lack of noise is predicting the
presence of something under certain arbitrary rules
only, such as those employed in the first experiment
(i.e. ‘food is hidden in one of two locations’). However,
this became partially invalid when we introduced the un-
rewarded ‘shake-rotate’-trials. Thus, with this step we
changed the arbitrary contingencies of the experiment,
whereas the underlying causal rules remained intact.
Taken together, our findings demonstrate for the first
time that a non-ape species is able to solve an auditory
‘inference by exclusion’ task instantaneously. The strong
first-trial performance as well as the performance in the
control tasks suggest that the parrots may indeed be
capable of causal reasoning, which is in line with findings
obtained in another reasoning task [15]. Yet, their per-
formance is error-prone and may be influenced by
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